The Soviet intervention in the war, as we shall see in later chapters, was further complicated by a political and cultural agenda that was made manifest in a variety of ways-some benign and others quite destructive-not only in the Spanish Republic but also in the Soviet Union and internationally. As the present section is concerned only with diplomacy, other components of the Soviet regime's involvement in wartime Spain will be reserved for subsequent chapters of this work. For now, let us concentrate on Soviet diplomatic maneuverings: at the NIC seat in London, at the newly established embassy and consulate in Spain, and in relation to the Republic's wartime mission to Moscow.
The concept of non-intervention was born from the French and British governments' common desire to avoid a clash with the fascist powers over the Iberian Peninsula. That the Western democracies would indeed stay out of the war was not immediately apparent, for the prospect of the Republic's overthrow had rightfully sounded alarms through the halls of at least one government, that of France. Not only did the Spanish Republic have a legal claim to international assistance in suppressing an internal rebellion, a potential rebel victory was also cause for great concern to Spain's closest democratic neighbor. It was widely thought that the imposition of a regime in Madrid sympathetic to, if not allied with, Hitler and Mussolini would leave France caught in a vise between three hostile forces. France's interwar defensive preparations were concentrated solely on the northeastern border; Paris could not defend its sovereignty against additional threats from the southeast and southwest. A hostile Spain would also threaten France's supply route to its colonies in northern and western Africa. At the same time, the implication for Britain was obvious: a France surrounded by antagonistic powers would leave London without a major continental ally.
However convincing these justifications for intervention in favor of the Loyalists, in both France and Britain even stronger forces were lobbying to stay out of the war entirely. Blum's government in Paris, though a kindred Popular Front coalition, sensibly feared that the armed Iberian struggle between left and right could spill over into France. Baldwin's National government in Britain, meanwhile, though hardly concerned over the threat of civil war, was far from sympathetic to the plight of a regime it had long regarded as "red." It is worth remembering that, in the mid-1930s, the British ruling and upper classes, and to a certain degree the press, feared the excesses of the left far more than those of the right.
The French, who had initially backed Madrid, reversed course on 25 July.
By early August, both France and its ally across the Channel had agreed to oversee an international body that sought to neutralize the possibility that the Spanish Civil War could erupt into a European-wide conflagration. In the first week of August the French diplomatic corps was enlisted to shop the idea of non-intervention around the major continental capitals. The USSR, at that date still officially on the fence, was one of the first to come out in favor of collective non-intervention. On 5 August, Moscow announced that it would subscribe to the proposal only if Portugal-by then clearly aiding the rebels-also signed on. The many twists and turns of Soviet involvement on the NIC need not detain us much longer, for historians have long had access to the Public Records Office archive of the Committee, and the published accounts of this ineffective international body are quite satisfactory.
Of primary importance, however, is the Soviet reaction to the escalation of German, Italian, and Portuguese military aid to the rebels even after those countries joined the Non-Intervention Committee. On three separate occasions-7, 12, and 23 OctoberMoscow repeated that if NIC signatory states continued to supply arms to the rebels, the Soviet government would "consider itself free from the obligations" of the Non-Intervention Agreement, or "would not consider itself bound" by the pact.
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These pronouncements, like countless others emanating from the proceedings, were highly disingenuous. As we will see below, by early September the Kremlin had begun preparations for its own military assistance to the Loyalists. The first shipment of arms would arrive in Spain in early October, even as the Soviets were threatening to abandon the London committee. But Moscow's emerging relations with the Spanish Republic were far more complicated than is indicated by the obvious discrepancy between the Defense Commissariat's military pipeline to Spain and the oratorical bluster of the Soviet representative in London. Occurring at the same time was the formal rapprochement between the governments of the USSR and the Spanish Republic, and it is to this development that we now turn our attention.
II. Stalin's Diplomats in the Republic
At the very moment the Politburo was cabling instructions to Maiskii regarding Moscow's position on non-intervention, the Soviet leadership was also meeting to appoint personnel for its embassy in the Spanish Republic. After the myriad impediments to normalized Soviet-Spanish diplomacy since 1931, it took the two states only one month following the beginning of the civil war to agree to an exchange of ambassadors. On 21 August, two days prior to its adherence to the Non-Intervention Agreement, the Politburo met to make embassy appointments. Marcel Rosenberg, a twenty-year veteran of the Soviet diplomatic corps and former Soviet delegate to the League of Nations, was given the nod as ambassador. The general consul to Barcelona would be Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, a revolutionary hero and the leader of the assault on the Winter Palace.
In addition to a staff of assistants and interpreters, the Politburo appointed Jacob Gaikis as secretary to the Madrid delegation and Arthur Stashevsky as commercial attaché. In his own speech at the ceremony, Azaña avoided any acknowledgement that the political systems of the USSR and the Spanish Republic were highly dissimilar. But appreciating the potential salvation in an alliance with the Soviets, Azaña declared that the exchange of ambassadors was "one of the most important events" to grace his presidency.
Later, Rosenberg's actions would stand in stark contrast to his early promise of non-intervention. At the time, of course, the remarks made for good diplomacy with his hosts, and good copy in Russia, where, three days later, Izvestiia printed his speech in full.
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At the time of the new ambassador's reception in Madrid, Catalonia was still without an official Soviet representative. In the absence of an appointed Soviet consul, in September 1936 the correspondent Ilya Ehrenburg used his journalistic cover to supply reports to Rosenberg on the political and military situation in Barcelona. These dispatches, which included detailed notes of meetings with the Catalan President Lluis Companys, were considered important enough to forward in duplicate to the entire Soviet leadership. Of special importance are the installments of 17 and 18 September, in which Ehrenburg alerts Rosenberg of two simultaneous crises developing, on the one hand between the Catalan regional government and the anarchist federation (FAI), and on the other between the Loyalist seat in Madrid and the Catalan authorities. In Ehrenburg's version, the alleged intransigence of the anarchists threatened to weaken the overall war effort and delay the required military conversions in vital Catalan industries. The journalist also reported that Companys would welcome the establishment of a Soviet consulate in Barcelona.
Izvestiia
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While it is impossible to determine precisely when Ehrenburg's letters on the Catalan question arrived in Moscow, it appears that they elicited an unusually hasty response. On 21 September, the Politburo appointed Antonov-Ovseenko as consul general to Barcelona.
He departed immediately and arrived at his new post on 1 October.
This new chronology should resolve the long-disputed issue of the arrival of the Soviets' top diplomats. It is evident that the precise time of the appointment and arrival of the consul is not trivial; Antonov-Ovseenko's mission to Spain was quite unlike Rosenberg's, for it is convincing evidence of Moscow's evolving perception of the potential Soviet role in the conflict, specifically the need to rectify the perceived problem of Catalan revolutionary anarcho-syndicalism and to oversee a Soviet-style centralized authority in a republic that had, since its founding in 1931, allowed for extensive regional autonomy. With Antonov-Ovseenko came a staff of assistants and his wife Sofiia. Like the ambassador, his entourage was received cordially by the regional authorities. On 3 October, AntonovOvseenko presented his credentials to Lluis Companys, the president of Catalonia. As was the case with Rosenberg, the Consul General's activities were given glowing front-page coverage in Soviet newspapers. 35 The conduct of Rosenberg and Antonov-Ovseenko in Spain was fundamentally interventionist, but striking differences in personality and operational style caused observers to view the two men differently. The charges frequently leveled against Rosenberg include an exaggerated sense of self-importance, a tendency to micromanage, and a daily disregard for the autonomy of the Republican government. Certainly Rosenberg's earlier postings, first as the counselor to the Soviet Embassy in Paris, and later as the assistant Soviet secretary to the League of Nations, would have done much to elevate his confidence. In the French capital, Rosenberg was a popular figure in the salon life of the 1920s; in Geneva, meanwhile, his salary exceeded $25,000, and he possessed a large villa, two limousines, a battery of secretaries, and a young bride. 36 It is hard to imagine that the newly appointed ambassador to Spain did not attempt to replicate at least in part the lifestyle he had enjoyed during previous assignments to Western Europe. According to Louis Fischer, Rosenberg drew no small amount of attention in his frequent traversals of Madrid:
When we drove, a guard of the Spanish intelligence service sat with the chauffeur and our car was followed by another fast car. It was filled with six young bodyguards. They jumped out of their car the moment Rosenberg's car stopped. They followed him wherever he went and he would sometimes turn around and shoo them away. If he stepped into a pissoir on the Cuatro Caminos, they surrounded its tin walls and waited. 37 Moreover, if Rosenberg acted like a celebrity, he was certainly encouraged. Again, Fischer: 25 Once we got out in a park where militiamen were training. They recognized him right away, saluted with the clenched fist and shouted, "Viva Rusia." "Viva España," he yelled back. The men were amused. "That's the Fascist cry," I told him. "You should say, 'Viva la República.'" "Viva la República," he yelled. 38 Apart from the purely showy aspects of his character, Rosenberg's excesses had a more insidious nature. The socialist leader Luis Araquistain summed up Rosenberg's comportment this way:
More than an ambassador, [Rosenberg] acted like a Russian viceroy in Spain. He paid daily visits to Largo Caballero, sometimes accompanied by Russians of high rank, military or civilian. During the visits, which lasted hours on end, Rosenberg tried to give the head of the Spanish government instructions as to what he should do in order to direct the war successfully. His suggestions, which were practically orders, related mainly to army officers. Such and such generals and colonels should be dismissed and others appointed in their place. These recommendations were based, not on the competence of the officers, but on their political affiliations and on the degree of their amenability to the Communists. 39 This was not the behavior expected from the same diplomat who had recently pledged to respect the Republic's political institutions. If many Loyalist officials tolerated the Soviet ambassador, it was in part due to the exigencies of war and the overwhelming importance of Russian military aid. But Prime Minister Largo Caballero grew tired of Rosenberg's frequent visits and unambiguous demands regarding policy and appointments. On one oftcited occasion, the ambassador pushed the prime minister too far, prompting the following explosion:
Get out! Get out! You must learn, Señor Ambassador, that the Spaniards may be poor and need aid from abroad, be we are sufficiently proud not to accept that a foreign ambassador should try and impose his will on the head of the Spanish government. ... unhealthy [sense of] self-esteem. He is terribly afraid for his authority; he fears lest someone should do something greater than what he does. The result is that he fritters away his energy.... He is incredibly nervous whenever one of us goes into a situation on our own to handle something.... Too much petty surveillance means that he is missing the forest for the trees. 41 Others shared this assessment. A Soviet political worker reported to Moscow that, shortly after arriving in Madrid in September 1936, he had his first of several altercations with Rosenberg. The ambassador had spoken to him, the advisor wrote, "in a way in which a Bolshevik should not speak." 42 By December 1936, talk of Rosenberg's questionable conduct had reached Stalin's desk. As a result, the Soviet leader sent Largo Caballero a personal letter asking for an assessment of the advisory staff in Spain, and in particular his opinion concerning Rosenberg.
Caballero's reply would seem to be favorable: 43 The comrades who have come to assist us at our request are providing a great service. Their considerable experience is very useful to us and contributes in an efficient manner to the defense of Spain.... I can assure you that they are executing their duties with true enthusiasm and extraordinary courage. As for comrade Rosenberg, I can frankly report to you that we are satisfied with his conduct and activities among us. Everyone here is fond of him. He works a great deal, excessively in fact, and endangers his delicate fragile health.... 44 35 The meaning of this letter is difficult to assess. Does it cast into doubt the well-known stories of a Largo Caballero at his wits' end with the ambassador? Or is it an indication only of the prime minister's desire to curry the best possible favor with the Soviet leadership? Or is the letter even authentic? Though widely quoted and incorporated into the scholarship on the war, its precise wording is disputed by the tirelessly anti-communist Araquistain. According to Araquistain-in a claim never substantiated elsewhere-Caballero's reply to Stalin was ambiguous but subtly negative: "The ambassador's health seems rather delicate," Caballero is purported to have written. "Perhaps a change of air would do him well."
Given that Rosenberg would be recalled four weeks after the letter was sent, one obvious conclusion is that the Stalin acted on Caballero's (alleged) displeasure by removing the ambassador. But the question of Rosenberg's recall is best discussed together with Antonov-Ovseenko's removal.
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In contrast to Rosenberg, Antonov-Ovseenko was less combative and more perceptive of the nuances of inter-party relations in the Spanish Republic. Indeed, as Antonov-Ovseenko told Ehrenburg prior to traveling to Barcelona, his specific assignment was to bring the Catalan anarchists into the main war effort:
Moscow is of the opinion that rapprochement between Catalonia and Madrid is in Spain's interest. I must attempt to bring the anarchists to their senses, and bring them aboard the defensive struggle. The documentary evidence preserves no record of Antonov-Ovseenko's reaction to Durruti's mysterious death in Madrid on 20 November. Given the consul's frustration with the anarchist leader, and his apparent role in getting Durruti sent to Madrid, it is tempting to view Antonov-Ovseenko's subsequent letter of condolence to Companys-not to mention the consul's prominent appearance at Durruti's funeral-as a somewhat disingenuous cover. 58
While Antonov-Ovseenko's primary objective as consul general was to address the ideological and regional differences between the center and the Catalans, this was not the only issue on his agenda. The consul was also an active agent in the Soviet propaganda campaign at the front and in the rear guard. The broader parameters of Soviet cultural policy in Spain will be addressed in Chapter Three, but as the present discussion centers on the activities of the Soviet diplomats, Antonov-Ovseenko's participation must be at least briefly noted.
From the first days of his assignment in Spain, Antonov-Ovseenko was a key figure in disseminating Soviet cultural products to various organizations and effecting the insertion of Soviet propaganda into local media. To facilitate this work, he collaborated closely with the All-Union Society for Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries, or VOKS. VOKS forwarded to Antonov-Ovseenko every conceivable variety of propaganda-the writings of Lenin and Stalin, newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, current Soviet fiction, films, photographs, and even phonographic records-which the consul then distributed to the press, public educational institutions, worker cooperatives and clubs, and to soldiers at the front. The consul also coordinated speaking tours for pro-Soviet Spanish worker delegations that had visited the Soviet Union. 
III. The Diplomats Recalled
Whether through propaganda efforts such as these, attempts to influence the policies of Largo Caballero, or manipulation of the placement of military units, both Antonov-Ovseenko and Rosenberg were by any measure active and aggressive players on the Spanish Republic's wartime stage. Even if much of their activity ostensibly remained within the broad goals of supporting the Republic's military effort, the overall impression made on many Republican observers was doubtlessly negative. Even Antonov-Ovseenko admitted in one dispatch to Moscow that his bellicose intervention in Catalan military affairs had provoked "distrust of our intentions." Rosenberg, of course, had outdone even the consul, succeeding in getting himself thrown out of the prime minister's office. How, one wonders, did these performances play in Moscow?
There is ample evidence to suggest that the Soviet leadership was greatly distressed by the continually ruffling of Spanish feathers by the Kremlin's top diplomats. In the muchdiscussed letter from Stalin to Largo Caballero, dated 21 December 1936, the Soviet leader advocated measures that would "prevent the enemies of Spain from regarding it as a communist Republic." In practice, this would mean pursuing a "parliamentary road"
rather than a revolutionary one, appeasing the rural and urban middle classes, and involving the Republican Party more directly in the functions of the government. More to the point, however, Stalin also asked Largo Caballero for his opinion of Rosenberg and the rest of the advisory staff. By any reckoning, the letter reflects a concern in Moscow that the conduct of the diplomatic mission might not be in line with the non-revolutionary direction that it was felt the Republic must now take.
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It appears that, after December 1936, the Kremlin's faith in Rosenberg and AntonovOvseenko diminished rapidly. Curiously, Spain's ambassador to the USSR, Marcelino Pascua, was better apprised of Moscow's view of the men than the doomed diplomats themselves. On 2 February 1937, Pascua met in the Kremlin with Stalin, Voroshilov, and Molotov. Midway through the meeting, Stalin surprised the ambassador by criticizing his principal representatives in Spain:
As for Rosenberg, we'll recall him and send down someone less Someone more "official." And as for Antonov-Ovseenko, we'll substitute him with someone less revolutionary and conspicuous.
enfant terrible.
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Even while Pascua was absorbing these pronouncements, Stalin looked to the Spaniard for help in his decision. "Who of our other representatives, excluding the diplomats," Stalin asked, "should we allow to continue working?" Pascua pointed no fingers for the Soviet dictator, but exactly a week later, on 9 February, the Politburo voted to recall Rosenberg and promote his deputy, Leon Gaikis, to the ambassadorship. 66 Thus Gaikis, who had served as counselor in the embassy the previous August, became head of the Soviet diplomatic mission. Thus, nine months after Moscow had established its first embassy in the Spanish Republic since the Russian Revolution, it had recalled its second and final ambassador and condemned this and two additional diplomats to their deaths. The civil war would of course rage on for another twenty-two months, and Moscow would continue to be the only major arms supplier to the Republic. For the balance of the war, however, the Soviets had no high-level diplomat on the Iberian Peninsula.
Considering the frequent claims in the historical literature that Stalin hoped to turn Spain into a Soviet satellite, or at least a closely allied People's Republic, the permanent withdrawal of diplomatic personnel in the first year of the war is a development that merits closer examination. Most historians have viewed Rosenberg's recall, coming so soon after the altercation in Largo Caballero's office, as a direct result of the ambassador's attempts to manipulate Republican policies. This interpretation is not, however, unanimous. In their recent study of primary documents relating to the Soviet intervention, Habeck and Radosh reject the thesis that Rosenberg was recalled for his wanton disregard of his host government's autonomy since, in their view, "all of the Soviet advisors were busily 80 2/20/04 1:58 PMattempting to take over the Spanish war effort, the economy, the PCE and, eventually, the Spanish government itself." They conclude that, "Rosenberg's efforts to do the same could hardly have provoked Stalin to pull him out." Instead, the scholars argue, Rosenberg was recalled and subsequently murdered because of his poor management style and petty squabbling with other members of the Soviet delegation. Stalin then mentioned that the first stage of the policy of distancing would be the recall of the two high-level Soviet diplomats present in Spain. In view of this evidence, it seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the downgrading of the Soviet mission in the Spanish Republic was motivated by Stalin's desire to eventually win over the West.
Stalin's comments to Pascua do not entirely resolve the issue. As we will see below in the discussion of the military advisors in Part V, the diplomats were not alone in being singled out for recall and destruction by the Soviet leadership. A high percentage of all Soviet personnel who were sent to Spain would perish in the purges. The fate of Rosenberg, Antonov-Ovseenko, and Gaikis was shared by many who were less visible and operated in areas far removed from diplomacy. It may therefore be advisable to again consider the demise of the diplomats together with the rest of the Soviet contingent.
That said, let us not ignore the fact that a certain logic vis-à-vis diplomacy and the Soviet intervention has now emerged. By early 1937, Stalin had decided that, although military aid would continue and propaganda campaigns would be mounted in both the USSR and the Spanish Republic to reinforce the notion of solidarity, in the highly visible area of diplomatic relations the Soviets needed to withdraw. This meant the recall of the active and omnipresent Rosenberg and Antonov-Ovseenko, and the substitution of the less conspicuous Gaikis. In the same vein, Gaikis' May 1937 recall and the simultaneous decision to leave the top diplomatic posts vacant signal that the Kremlin was by then convinced that nothing could be gained by maintaining high-level diplomatic relations.
In general terms, Soviet diplomatic activity in the Spanish Republic was quite unlike any of Moscow's other foreign relations efforts. For much of the Soviet era, there were two models for the Kremlin's diplomatic operations abroad. The first might be called "normal diplomatic relations"-that, is, arrangements which sought to reinforce amicable cultural and commercial ties with another state, even if great ideological divisions existed. This was the modus operandi pursued by the Soviet Union with most of the West. Where the Soviet Union held sway over a state through military occupation-for example, in the Eastern European "people's democracies"-a second model was employed. Here the Soviets were not bound by ideological differences and never ran the risk of causing offense or jeopardizing commercial agreements. The Soviet diplomat in a satellite state was, in effect, a viceroy.
Diplomatically, the Spanish Republic fit neither mold. The Republic constituted a unique case for Moscow, a state where the Kremlin attempted to consolidate influence through atypical diplomatic maneuvering, but where its lack of military supremacy prevented the exertion of full control. The inherent inability of Soviet diplomacy to impose Stalin's will in Spain was not, of course, decisive or even especially costly. Subsequent chapters of this study will make clear that the story of Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War was, in fact, a tale of multiple interventions. The diplomatic option may have given the Kremlin more headaches than success, but it was far from the only weapon in their arsenal. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter Three, the Soviet leadership was not entirely responsible for the failure of diplomatic rapprochement with Spain. The case of the Republic's embassy in Moscow mirrors in unusually curious ways the Soviet mission to Loyalist Spain. This side of the diplomatic relationship, for which equally high expectations were rapidly downgraded and ultimately dashed, will be the subject of the next chapter.
Notes:
"... el Gobierno y el pueblo soviéticos, unidos en una sola voluntad, se colocaran con entusiasmo, desde el primer momento, al lado del pueblo español cuando éste fue víctima de la rebelión de los generales fascistas." Dolores Ibárruri, et al., Guerra y revolución en España 1936 -1939 (Moscow: Progreso, 1967 
